Update on what the Egyptian Army wants

Just after I created the post below about the Egyptian Army and the Gaza blockade, I stumble across this article by Yezid Sayigh in the FT from a couple of weeks ago. What I wrote essentially conforms to what he thinks the army will be doing in the post-Mubarak Egypt, namely, aiming to keep the country and its foreign policy stable (though I probably think Egypt's foreign policy is a lot more in Egypts own genuine interests rather than only being in Egypt's interests because of the frosty peace with Israel and the desire to keep the US aid pump running). Here are the most pertinent parts of the article:

The army’s desire for stability has several implications. First, it will prefer the recent democratic advances to continue, albeit in a controlled manner, to ensure an arrangement that will allow it to stay out of politics and off the streets. The appointment of an ex-general as prime minister may have been meant as a sop but the injection of ex-officers into the cabinet is unlikely to have been an army demand. There will be no return to military rule, not even a partial one.

Second, the army will resist radical shifts in foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis Israel, not least because of the risk to US assistance, which is crucial for an army that is heavily dependent on US military hardware and technology and on the assured supply of spares, training and know-how. The behind-the-scenes role that it is no doubt playing cannot but be prompted by a desire to prevent changes that might destabilise the cold peace with Israel and jeopardise the special relationship with the US military.

Third, the army will seek to preserve its control over its own internal governance and protect its reputed economic “empire”. This is considerably more modest in volume than is commonly believed, and has probably shrunk in proportion to a national economy that has grown by more than 3 per cent annually since 2003. However, although a few generals are rumoured to have become rich, the main purpose of ensuring a separate income stream that is off-limits to government auditors or parliamentary oversight is to ameliorate the impact of a rapidly privatising economy on the living standards of officers.

Given scenes like this in Cairo, where millions in Tahrir Square are chanting "To Jerusalem (al Quds) we go, for us to be the Martyrs of Millions”, it seems like the army will have its work cut out for it in resisting the anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian demogogy.

Given the supreme interest the army has in keeping the peace, keeping stability in the country and the region, keeping the security situation in the Sinai under control, keeping Hamas' and the Muslim Brotherhood's influence from expanding, and keeping US aid filling its coffers, I think the army will manage to resist the calls from the street to take a much harder line towards Israel and to be much more lenient on the Gazans.

It is going to cause a lot of friction, no doubt, but I really don't see the developments in Egypt as having a huge effect on the blockade, or the peace with Israel for that matter, no matter how many times the Muslim Brotherhood calls for the treaty to be abrogated.